Guía docente de Teoría de Juegos (M56/56/1/5)

• Normal-form games
• Nash equilibrium
• Extensive-form games
• Subgame Perfect equilibrium
• Repeated games
• Bayesian games.
• Matching theory

Basic knowledge of mathematics (algebra, calculus, probability,...)

• To identify the basic concepts of Game Theory and its most prominent economic applications.
• To analyze a strategic situation and obtain good predictions about economic agents’ behavior.
• To model any strategic situation as a formal problem of Game Theory by using the concepts learnt along the course.
• To apply the most suitable solution concepts of Game Theory to each particular situation.
• To determine the variables that affect agents’ behavior in a particular strategic situation.
• To understand and use the information of the behavior in a strategic environment

PART A: Basics on (non-cooperative) game theory

• Strategic games with complete information.     
  • Chapter 1: Solution Concepts
  • Chapter 2: Mixed strategy equilibrium

• Strategic games with incomplete information.   
  • Chapter 3: Bayesian games

• Extensive games with complete information.    
  • Chapter 4: Extensive games with perfect information.           
  • Chapter 5: Extensive games with imperfect information.
  • Chapter 6: Repeated games

PART B: Matching: Theory and Applications

• Chapter 1: House allocation
• Chapter 2: Assignments of doctors to hospitals
• Chapter 3: Assignment and exchange of kidneys for transplants.
• Chapter 4: School Choice

Problem sets 

• Practice 1. Exercises on Strategic games with complete information.
• Practice 2. Exercises on Dynamic games with complete information.
• Practice 3. Exercises on Extensive games with complete information
• Practice 4: Exercises on Matching Theory and Allocation

Seminars

• Each student will present an individual  work based on the application of game theoretical concepts to real economic issues.
• Prominent researchers on Game Theory will present their recent projects.

• Osborne, M. J. (2004). An introduction to game theory (Vol. 3, No. 3). New York: Oxford University Press.

• Binmore, K. (2007). Game theory: a very short introduction. Oxford University Press.
• Fudenberg, D., & Tirole, J. (1991). Game theory. MIT Press Books, 1.
• Gibbons, R. (1992). A primer in game theory. FT Prentice Hall Publisher, London.
• Leyton-Brown, K., & Shoham, Y. (2008). Essentials of game theory: A concise multidisciplinary introduction. Synthesis Lectures on Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning, 2(1), 1-88.
• Myerson, R. B. (2013). Game theory. Harvard university press.
• Osborne, M. J., & Rubinstein, A. (1994). A course in game theory. MIT press.
• Roth, A. E., & Sotomayor, M. A. O. (1990). Two-sided matching, volume 18 of Econometric Society Monographs.

https://www.youtube.com/user/gametheoryonline

https://www.selcukozyurt.com/home/teaching/game-theory

Article 17 of the UGR Assessment Policy and Regulations establishes that the ordinary assessment session (convocatoria ordinaria) will preferably be based on the continuous assessment of students, except for those who have been granted the right to a single final assessment (evaluación única final), which is an assessment method that only takes a final exam into account.

• Exam on Part A (40%)
  • This exam will be a test questionnaire.
  • Wrong answers will penalize.
• Practical exercises to deliver (15%) for Part A.
• Individual project and its presentation on applications of some of the models analyzed during the course (25%)
• Problem set on PART B (20%)

Article 19 of the UGR Assessment Policy and Regulations establishes that students who have not passed a course in the ordinary assessment session (convocatoria ordinaria) will have access to an extraordinary assessment session (convocatoria extraordinaria). All students may take part in this extraordinary assessment session, regardless of whether or not they have followed continuous assessment activities. In this way, students who have not carried out continuous assessment activities will have the opportunity to obtain 100% of their mark by means of an exam and/or assignment.
 

• Exam on Parts A and B (100%) 
  • It will be a test questionnaire.
  • Wrong answers will penalize.

Article 8 of the UGR Assessment Policy and Regulations establishes that students who are unable to follow continuous assessment methods due to justifiable reasons shall have recourse to a single final assessment (evaluación única final), which is an assessment method that only takes a final exam into account.

In order to opt for a single final assessment (evaluación única final), students must send a request, using the corresponding online procedure, to the coordinator of the master’s programme, in the first two weeks of the course or in the two weeks following their enrolment (if the enrolment has taken place after the classes have already begun). The coordinator will communicate this information to the relevant teaching staff members, citing and verifying the reasons why the student is unable to follow the continuous assessment system.

In this case, the assessment will comprise:

• Exam on Parts A and B (100%).
  • It will be a test questionnaire.
  • Wrong answers will penalize.

INCLUSION and DIVERSITY. In the case of students with disabilities or other specific educational support needs (NEAE), the tutoring system will be adapted to these needs, following the recommendations of the inclusion area at the University of Granada. Departments and centers will establish appropriate measures to ensure that tutorials take place in accessible locations. Additionally, at the request of faculty, support can be requested from the competent unit at UGR for special methodological adaptations.